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ence in these Fund approved
payments and the claim of Advance. Id.
The court concluded by
giving specific judicial recognition to Advance's argument,
holding that it is consistent with
the purposes ofthe Fund to recognize that the fiduciary ethical
obligation embodied in Conduct Rule 1.15 is a fiduciary
obligation under the Fund's statutes and rules. Id. at 210-11,
652 A.2d at 667. The court
vacated the Fund's decision and

Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co. v. Cochran:
EXTRINSIC
EVIDENCE MAY
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remanded for a determination
on reimbursement. Id. at 211,
652 A.2d at 667-68.
In its simplest form, the
court's decision in Advance
Finance Co. v. Trustees ofClients 'Sec. Trust Fund ofBar of
Md expands a non-client's eligibility as a claimant against
the Fund. However, Advance
derives its true impact from the
court's recognition that a nonclient's loss from an attorney's
defalcation, at least where a client has instructed the attorney

to disburse the client's funds to
the non-client, is no less damaging to the legal profession's
credibility that the same loss to
the client. This is precisely the
situation the Fund was established to address, and although
the court's decision may increase the potential for recovery, it should be welcomed by
attorneys at a time when the
term "legal ethics" is all too
often, whetherjustifiablyornot,
considered a misnomer.
-Mark L. Miller

In Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co. v. Cochran, 337 Md
98, 651 A.2d 859 (1995), the
Court of Appeals of Maryland
held that an insured may use
extrinsic evidence to establish a
potentiality of coverage under
an insurance policy when the
plaintiff s complaint is silent as
to possible defenses entitled to
coverage. The court rejected an
earlier decision by the court of
special appeals which mandated that determining the possibility of coverage of an insured
tort defendant be made solely
by reference to the language of
the insurance policy and the
complaint made against him.
In so holding, the court remedied any inequities in the interpretation of coverage under liability insurance policies and
addressed public policy concerns regarding an insured's

reasonable expectations.
Victoria and Robert Beyer
sued Robert Cochran for assault, battery, and loss of consortium for injuries Victoria receivedduringaMarch 19,1990
altercation between Cochran
and his brother at Cochran's
office. At the time of the alleged incident, Cochran was
covered under two office liability policies issued by Aetna.
Although the policies provided
no coverage for intentional or
expected bodily injury or property damage caused by the acts
of the insured, both provided
coverage for intentional acts of
self-defense. Despite Cochran's
contention thatBeyer' s injuries
occurred while he was defending himself against his brother's assault, Aetna refused to
provide him with counsel to
defend against the Beyer ac-
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tion. Aetna based its refusal on
the policies' exclusion for intentional torts not committed in
self-defense.
After hiring his own
private counsel to defend
against the Beyer suit, Cochran
filed a declaratory judgment
action against Aetna in the Circuit Court for Allegany County
seeking a determination that
Aetna had a duty to defend him
in the Beyer action. Cochran
contended that the allegations
contained in the Beyer complaint established the potential
for coverage due to self-defense.
The circuit court held that Aetna
had no duty to defend Cochran
in the Beyer action because the
Beyer's complaint alleged intentional torts neither covered
nor potentially covered by the
Aetna policies.
The court of special appeals reversed the circuit court,
holding that Aetna had a duty to
defend Cochran because of the
potentiality of coverage on the
face of the Beyer complaint. In
an effort to clarify the ambiguity surrounding an insurer's duty
to defend an insured from tort
claims, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland granted certiorari.
The court began its analysis by exp laining that an insurer has "a duty to defend its
insured from all claims which
are potentially covered under
an insurance policy." Cochran,
337 Md. at 102, 651 A.2d at
861, (quoting Brohawn v.
Transamericalns. Co.,276Md.
396,347 A.2d842 (1975)). The
Brohawn court interpreted the
term "potentially" to encom-

pass when a plaintiff s allegations against an insured in a tort
suit allege a claim covered by
the policy in addition to any
claim potentially covered by the
policy. Id. at 102-03,651 A.2d
at 861.
The court then applied a
two prong test to determine
whether Aetna was under a duty
to defend Cochran in accordance with the spirit of the
Brohawn decision. Id. at 103,
651 A.2d at 862 (citing St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Pryseski, 292 Md. 187, 438
A.2d 282 (1981)). The first
prong necessitated an examination of the language of the policy, construing its terms in their
"customary, ordinary and accepted meaning," Id. at 104,
651 A.2d at 862 (quoting
Mitchell v. Maryland Casualty,
324 Md. 44, 56, 595 A.2d 469,
475 (1991)) "unless a statute, a
regulation, or public policy is
violated thereby." Id. at 104,
651 A.2dat 862 (quotingPacific Indemnity Co. v. Interstate
Fire & Casualty Co., 302 Md.
383,488A.2d486(1985)). The
court found that the terms of
Cochran's policy covered all
bodily injury resulting from
defense of persons or property,
even if the bodily injury was
intended by the insured. Id. at
104-05, 651 A.2d at 862.
The second prong ofthe
test required the court to determine whether the allegations of
a tort complaint against an insured could potentially bring
the tort action within policy
coverage. Id. at 105, 651 A.2d
at 862. BecausetheBeyercom-
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plaint failed to allude to the
affirmative defense of self-defense, the paramount issue became whether Cochran could
use extrinsic evidence of selfdefense to show that his actions
could potentially be covered by
the policies. Relying on a past
decision of the court of special
appeals, Aetna argued for adoption of the exclusive pleading
rule which would mandate that
a determination of a potentiality of coverage be made solely
by reference to the insurance
policy and the complaint and
not by use ofextrinsic evidence.
Id. at 105, 651 A.2d at 863
(citing Eastern Shore Financial v. Donegal Mut., 84 Md.
App.609,581 A.2d452(1990),
cert.denied sub nom. Insley v,
Old Guard Mut. Ins. Co., 322
Md. 131, 586A.2d 13 (1991)).
The court of appeals
rejected the application of the
exclusive pleading rule to insurance contracts and determined that insurance policies
and allegations in complaints
"are not the sole means of establishing a potentiality of coverage." Id. at 108,651 A.2dat
864. The court added that an
application of the exclusive
pleading rule to insurance contracts would unfairly leave the
insured atthe mercy ofthe plaintiff s complaint and would virtually preclude him from proving a potentiality of coverage in
assault and battery cases, where
coverage could only be established by tendering a defense to
the claims. Id. at 108-09,651
A.2d at 864. The court further
supported its rejection of the
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exclusive pleading rule by citing a decision which held that
an insured receives the benefit
ofthe doubt when potential coverage is uncertain from the allegations in the complaint. Id. at
107,651 A.2d at 863-64 (citing
US.F & G. v. Nat. Pav. Co.,
228 Md. 40, 178 A.2d 872
(1962)). The exclusive pleading rule, the court opined, can
often deprive the insured of the
benefit of his bargain in an insurance contract by permitting
the insurer to look exclusively
at the complaint and ignore valid defenses to avoid coverage.
Id. at 110-11,651 A.2d at 865.
The court noted an exception for frivolous defenses

made by the insured solely to
establish an insurer's duty to
defend. Id. at 111-12,651 A.2d
at 866. In combatting potential
abuse, the court limited an insured's use ofextrinsic evidence
to establish a potentiality of
coverage to situations where
the insured can demonstrate a
"reasonable potential that the
issue triggering coverage will
be generated at trial." Id. at
112, 651 A.2d at 866. Because
Cochran had presented corroborating testimony and other
evidence supporting the potentiality of coverage, the court
found that Cochran's claim of
self-defense was not frivolous.
Id. at 112, 651 A.2d at 866.

Aetna Casualty & Surety Company v. Cochran clearly
reinforces the public policy concern that insurance policy holders should not be unreasonably
precluded from receiving the
coverage bargained for in their
insurance contracts. The court's
holding will make it considerably more difficult for insurers
to avoid their obligations to defend insureds, while simultaneously providing a safeguard
against frivolous claims of potential coverage.
- Jeffrey A. Friedman

Curry v. Hillcrest
Clinic, Inc.:

In Curry v. Hillcrest
Clinic, Inc., 337 Md. 412, 653
A.2d 934 (1995), the Court of
Appeals of Maryland held that
where a common basis of liability is alleged against co-defendants, one ofwhom has been
found in default, a finding in
favor ofthe non-defaulting codefendant automatically inures
to the benefit of the defaulting
co-defendant. In such cases,
despite an original order of default, damages cannot be assessed against the defaulting
co-defendant. Consequently,
the order in default must be
stricken. This holding signified the court of appeal's recognition, affirmance, and continued acceptance of the Frow

doctrine, first enunciated in the
United States Supreme Court
decision Frow v. De La Vega,
82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 552 (1872).
Curry involved a malpractice claim filed with the
Health Claims Arbitration Office (HCAO) alleging the negligence and liability of Dr.
Sharma and the liability of
Hillcrest Clinic (Hillcrest),
Sharma's employer, under the
doctrine of respondeat superior. Hillcrest failed to answer
Curry's complaint, and an order of default was entered by
the HCAO Director against
Hillcrest stating that the amount
of damages owed by Hillcrest
was to be determined by the
HCAO arbitration panel.

COURT OF APPEALS
REAFFIRMED
MARYLAND'S
ACCEPTANCE OF
THE "FROW
DOCTRINE" DEFAULTING
CO-DEFENDANTS
INURE TO THE
BENEFIT OF
JUDGMENTS IN
FAVOR OF NONDEFAULTING
CO-DEFENDANTS.

